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Abstract—In an Internet of Things network, multiple sensors
send information to a fusion center for it to infer a public
hypothesis of interest. However, the same sensor information
may be used by the fusion center to make inferences of a
private nature that the sensors wish to protect. To model this,
we adopt a decentralized hypothesis testing framework with
binary public and private hypotheses. Each sensor makes a
private observation and utilizes a local sensor decision rule or
privacy mapping to summarize that observation independently
of the other sensors. The local decision made by a sensor is
then sent to the fusion center. Without assuming knowledge of
the joint distribution of the sensor observations and hypotheses,
we adopt a nonparametric learning approach to design local
privacy mappings. We introduce the concept of an empirical
normalized risk, which provides a theoretical guarantee for the
network to achieve information privacy for the private hypothesis
with high probability when the number of training samples is
large. We develop iterative optimization algorithms to determine
an appropriate privacy threshold and the best sensor privacy
mappings, and show that they converge. Finally, we extend our
approach to the case of a private multiple hypothesis. Numerical
results on both synthetic and real data sets suggest that our
proposed approach yields low error rates for inferring the
public hypothesis, but high error rates for detecting the private
hypothesis.
Index Terms—Information privacy, decentralized hypothesis
testing, decentralized detection, nonparametric, empirical risk,
Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensor networks have seen widespread applications in in-
dustrial, military, and civilian monitoring applications like
intrusion detection, target tracking, leakage detection and fall
detection [1]–[7]. In the emerging Internet of Things (IoT)
paradigm, large numbers of sensors are deployed to enable
sense-making and intelligent analytics based on the sensors’
observations. This can be modeled using the decentralized
detection framework [8]–[14], where each sensor makes an
observation, summarizes this observation using a local deci-
sion rule, and sends the summary to a fusion center. Based on
the received sensor summaries, the fusion center then makes
the final inference on a phenomenon of interest.
While the fusion center’s role is to perform inference on
a particular hypothesis of interest, there is nothing stopping
it from using the received sensor information to infer an-
other correlated hypothesis. An example is the deployment
of home-monitoring video cameras in old folks’ homes for
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fall detection. If the cameras transmit the raw video feed to a
fusion center, the fusion center can not only use these video
feeds for fall detection, but also has the potential to intrude
on the privacy of the home inhabitants. The camera sensors
therefore need to perform intelligent observation summary
with a suitable sensor rule in order to limit the amount and
quality of information they send to the fusion center. Another
example is when an insurance company wishes to determine
if a person has a particular pre-existing medical condition
using medical records from hospitals the person has been
treated at. However, these medical records may reveal more
than the particular condition that the insurance company is
investigating. The hospitals will need to decide what to send
to the insurance company to avoid disclosing the person’s other
medical conditions. Although this latter example is not in the
context of sensor networks, we can see that it nevertheless falls
in the framework of how to preserve privacy in decentralized
detection while still enabling the fusion center to make an
inference on a particular hypothesis. In this paper, we call a
hypothesis a public hypothesis if its inference or detection is
to be achieved by a sensor network specifically designed for
this purpose. We call a hypothesis a private hypothesis if it
can also be inferred based on the same sensor observations,
but whose true state the sensor network wishes to protect. We
call preventing the accurate inference of the private hypothesis
information privacy (see Section II for a precise technical
definition).
The main focus of this paper is to protect information
privacy by making it difficult for the fusion center to perform
inference on the private hypothesis. It has been shown in [15]–
[17] that the error decay rate at the fusion center increases
with the quality of information that the sensors convey to it.
Therefore, by appropriately “degrading” the information sent
by each sensor to the fusion center, we aim to achieve a good
tradeoff between privacy leakage and the ability of the fusion
center to infer the public hypothesis.
A. Related Work
With ubiquitous IoT devices monitoring every aspect of
a user’s life, privacy is a main consideration for users
when adopting IoT technologies. Sensitive personal data like
lifestyle preferences and location information may be abused
for unwanted advertisement purposes or for more nefari-
ous objectives like unauthorized surveillance. Privacy in IoT
networks can be classified as data privacy and inference
privacy. Data privacy refers to the protection of sensor data
from unauthorized parties. Achieving data privacy has been
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2comprehensively addressed by methods typically involving
encryption or perturbation [18]–[25]. Although data privacy
ensures that each sensor datum is protected, it does not stop
a fusion center from inferring about a private hypothesis if
statistical information about it is still present in the aggregated
data.
The focus of this paper is inference privacy, whose aim is to
prevent the fusion center from using its received information
to accurately infer a private hypothesis. The paper [26] utilized
source coding so that a receiver can decode one source
within a prescribed distortion tolerance, while ensuring that
the mutual information between the decoded sequence and
another correlated private source is lower than a threshold.
The author also analyzed the privacy-utility tradeoff under this
formulation. The reference [27] extends the result of [26], and
designed a framework to quantify the privacy-utility tradeoffs.
An information-theoretic scheme for information privacy was
proposed by [28], which formulated a convex program to
find the privacy-preserving mapping to minimize the mutual
information between the private hypothesis and information
received at the fusion center, while satisfying certain utility
constraints. In [29], the minimum Bayesian error probability
for a fusion center to infer a private phenomenon is used as the
privacy metric, and a person-by-person optimization approach
is proposed to find sensor decision rules, but inference privacy
is not guaranteed in general. All the aforementioned ap-
proaches are designed to achieve a good utility-privacy trade-
off, but assume knowledge of the joint distribution of sensor
observations, public and private hypotheses. If a mismatched
joint distribution is utilized, the utility-privacy tradeoff is
impacted [30]. Knowing the underlying joint distribution may
not be practical in an IoT network. Therefore, in this paper,
we propose a nonparametric hypothesis testing approach with
information privacy constraints.
A nonparametric approach to inference privacy was pro-
posed by [31], [32], in which sensor data is mapped to a
subspace before being made available to the fusion center.
These methods can be adopted in a centralized platform
like cloud computing, but impractical for a sensor network
because it requires the use of a trusted data curator to first
aggregate observations from all sensors, and then performing
the privacy mapping on the aggregated data. Furthermore, no
theoretical guarantees of the level of privacy achievable are
provided in [31], [32]. In a decentralized architecture like
an IoT network, each sensor makes its local decision based
solely on its own observation, and independently of the other
sensors. A nonparametric decentralized detection method was
introduced by [33], which proposed the use of a kernel-based
method to learn the optimal sensor decision rules from a given
set of labeled training data. Subsequently, [34] extended this
method using a weighted kernel to allow sensor selection in
the decentralized detection procedure. These works however
do not address the inference privacy issue described above.
Following these works, we assume that a set of labeled training
data is available and employ a kernel-based approach to learn
the sensor rules subject to a privacy metric called information
privacy [28].
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we develop an information privacy preserving
framework for nonparametric hypothesis testing and algo-
rithms to realize our framework. Our main contributions are
as follows:
1) We adopt the concept of -information privacy from
[28], and show that a sufficient condition to achieve -
information privacy when the private hypothesis is binary,
is to ensure that the average of the Type I and II detection
error probabilities are large. We show that contrary to
intuition, a large Bayes detection error for the private
hypothesis does not ensure information privacy.
2) Since we do not assume knowledge of the underly-
ing joint distribution and we adopt a nonparametric
optimization framework, we introduce the concept of
(, δ)-information privacy, which is a weak form of -
information privacy. When the private hypothesis is bi-
nary, we propose a privacy metric constraint, which we
call the empirical normalized risk, and show that under
some mild technical assumptions, this achieves (, δ)-
information privacy for any δ > 0 when the training
sample size becomes large.
3) When both public and private hypotheses are binary,
we propose a nonparametric privacy-aware optimization
framework and iterative algorithms to learn an appropriate
privacy threshold for our empirical normalized risk, and
the optimal sensor privacy mappings. We show that
both algorithms converge to the critical points of their
respective objective functions.
4) We extend our optimization framework to the case where
the private hypothesis is m-ary with m > 2, and provide
a sufficient condition to achieve information privacy. This
condition translates into m − 1 empirical normalized
risk constraints in our optimization framework, which
achieves (, δ)-information privacy for any δ > 0 when
the training sample size becomes large.
5) We verify the performance of our algorithm on both
simulated data and real data. Our experiments suggest
that our approach can achieve low error rates for inferring
the public hypothesis, but high error rates for detecting
the private hypothesis.
This paper is an extension of our conference paper [35],
which utilized a nonparametric approach to learn sensor
decision rules under a Bayesian error probability privacy
constraint. As shown in this paper, that approach does not
guarantee information privacy in general.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present our system model and assumptions. We also
define information privacy and present a sufficient condition to
achieve it. In Section III, we propose a nonparametric privacy-
aware optimization framework based on an empirical normal-
ized risk constraint, to obtain the sensor privacy mappings. We
show that our approach achieves information privacy with high
probability as the training sample size becomes large. We then
propose an iterative algorithm for the optimization problem.
We present simulation results to verify the effectiveness of
3the proposed algorithms in Section IV, and we conclude in
Section V.
Notations: We use capital letters like X to denote random
variables or vectors, lowercase letters like x for deterministic
scalers, and boldface lowercase letters like x for determin-
istic vectors. We use R to denote the set of real numbers,
and Γc to be the complement of the set Γ. The indicator
function 1{A} takes value 1 iff the clause A is true. We let
(x)+ = max{x, 0}. We assume that all random variables are
defined on the same underlying probability measure space with
probability measure P, and E is the associated expectation
operator. In some cases, for clarity, we use EX to emphasize
that the expectation is with respect to (w.r.t.) X . We use pX(·)
to denote the probability mass function of X , and pX|Y (· | ·)
to denote the conditional probability mass function of X given
Y .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND INFORMATION PRIVACY
In this section, we first describe our system model and
assumptions, and then discuss the connection of our problem
setup with information privacy and differential privacy. We
provide a sufficient condition to achieve information privacy
for an IoT network.
A. System Model
We consider a decentralized detection network as shown
in Fig.1. Suppose that two hypotheses H and G each takes
binary values in {−1,+1}. Each sensor t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s},
makes a noisy observation Xt ∈ X of (H,G), where
X = {1, 2, . . . , |X |}. It then summarizes its observation using
a local decision rule or privacy mapping γt : X 7→ Z ,
with Z = {1, 2, . . . , |Z|}, and transmits Zt = γt(Xt) to a
fusion center. Each sensor’s local decision rule is allowed to
be a probabilistic mapping from X to Z . The transmission
from each sensor to the fusion center is constrained to a
limited number of bits, so that |X | ≥ |Z|. This models an
ad hoc IoT network with low-power devices that may be
battery operated. For example, the NB-IoT standard [36] is
developed for low-cost and low-power devices with limited
communication bandwidths. In this paper, we do not require
that the sensor observations Xt, t = 1, . . . , s are independent.
Let X = (X1, . . . , Xs) and Z = (Z1, . . . , Zs). Based on
the received messages Z, the fusion center makes a decision
Ĥ = γH(Z) ∈ {−1,+1} about the state of the hypothesis H .
We consider H to be the public hypothesis that the sensors
want the fusion center to infer correctly. On the other hand, G
is a private hypothesis that the sensors wish to hide from the
fusion center. The fusion center however is curious, and after
receiving the local decisions from the sensors, implements a
decision rule Ĝ = γG(Z) ∈ {−1,+1} to infer the private
hypothesis G. Our goal is to find, for each sensor t = 1, . . . , s,
a local decision rule or privacy mapping γt to minimize the
error probability P (H 6= γH(Z)), while making it difficult for
any fusion rule γG the fusion center may employ to detect G.
In the following Section II-B, we show that by making
the average of the Type I error P (γG(Z) = −1 | G = 1) and
Type II error P (γG(Z) = 1 | G = −1) sufficiently large, we
H, G
X1 X2 . . . Xs
Z1 Z2 . . . Zs
X ∈ X s
Z ∈ Zs
Hˆ = γH(Z)
Gˆ = γG(Z)
Fig. 1. An IoT network with public hypothesis H and private hypothesis G.
achieve information privacy [28] for the private hypothesis
G, which implies differential privacy [21]. However, to find
the optimal local sensor decision rules in order to facilitate
the inference of H while ensuring that both the Type I and
II errors are large, one needs to know the joint probability
distribution pX,H,G a priori. This assumption is impractical
for many IoT applications as the underlying joint distribution
may be difficult to model accurately. Therefore, we assume
that this distribution is unknown, but we are given a set
of n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) training
data (xi, hi, gi)ni=1 sampled from pX,H,G.
1 We adopt the
framework of empirical risk minimization as in [33] to design
the local sensor decision rules, which we discuss in detail in
Section III-A.
B. Information Privacy
To prevent the fusion center from inferring the true state
of the private hypothesis G based on the received sensor
messages Z, we need to design Z so that the prior and
posterior distributions of G are close to each other. This is the
definition of -information privacy given by [28], which we
recall below. Note that this differs from the more commonly
used differential privacy concept [21], [37], which [28] shows
is weaker than information privacy in general.
Definition 1 (Information privacy). Let G and Z be random
variables. For  > 0, G given Z or pG|Z has -information
privacy, if for almost surely any (G,Z) = (g, z), we have
e− ≤ pG|Z(g | z)
pG(g)
≤ e. (1)
The value  is called the information privacy budget.
In an IoT network, both data and information privacy
are important design aspects. Achieving data privacy has
been comprehensively addressed in [25], [38]–[41]. In this
paper, we focus on the information privacy aspect. In [28],
an optimization framework based on minimizing the mutual
information between G and Z is proposed. This leads to a
1In the sequel, we adopt the following convention: a superscript index
corresponds to a sensor index (e.g., Xt), while a subscript index corresponds
to either a training data index (e.g., xi) or a hypothesis.
4weaker privacy guarantee than information privacy. In the
following, we show that if G is a binary hypothesis, then
constraining the total probability of error in detecting G leads
to information privacy for G under some technical conditions.
We make following assumption.
Assumption 1. The priors pG(1), pG(−1) > 0. The supports
of the conditional distributions of Z given G = 1 and G = −1
are the same, and denoted as D.
Assumption 1 leads to no loss of generality and is required
to avoid trivial cases where G is perfectly detectable. For any
detector γ(Z) for G based on Z, let
R(γ) =
1
2
(P (γ(Z) = −1 | G = 1) + P (γ(Z) = 1 | G = −1))
be the average of the Type I and II error probabilities. For
each z ∈ D, let
`(z) =
pZ|G(z | 1)
pZ|G(z | −1) ,
and
c = min
{
P
(
`(z) = min
z∈D
`(z)
∣∣∣∣G = −1) ,
P
(
`(z) = max
z∈D
`(z)
∣∣∣∣G = 1)}. (2)
From Assumption 1, since 0 < `(z) <∞ for all z ∈ D, c > 0.
The following result shows that a small information privacy
budget is essentially equivalent to a large minγ R(γ). Since us-
ing (an empirical proxy of) minγ R(γ) as a privacy constraint
is more convenient than imposing (1) directly (which leads
to 2|Z| constraints when G is binary), the following propo-
sition allows us to formulate a compact privacy constraint in
Section III.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
(i) Let  > 0 be a sufficiently small positive constant. If
G given Z has -information privacy, then R(γG) ≥
θ/(2 maxg pG(g)), for all θ ∈ [0, 1/2] that satisfies
H(θ) ≤ H(G)− , (3)
with H(·) being the binary entropy function [42].
(ii) If minγ R(γ) ≥ θ ∈ [0, 1/2], G given Z achieves -
information privacy where  = log c(c+2θ−1)+ .
Proof: See Appendix A.
If the prior probabilities pG(1) = pG(−1) = 1/2,
minγ R(γ) is the Bayesian error probability. When the prior
for G is not uniform, the Bayes detector γ∗G with a large Bayes
error P (γ∗G(Z) 6= G) do not guarantee information privacy as
defined in Definition 1. An example is shown in Example 1,
and a simulation to demonstrate this is given in Section IV-A2.
To ensure information privacy, we require that both the Type
I and II error probabilities are large, which is equivalent to
having the risk minγ R(γ) to be sufficiently large.
Example 1. Suppose pG(−1) < 1/2, and G and Z ∈
{z1, z2} have the joint distribution shown in Table I. Then,
for all sufficiently large d, the optimal Bayesian error prob-
ability detector declares G∗ = 1 for all Z. The Bayes
error P (G∗ 6= G) = pG(−1), which is the largest possible
Bayes error for any distribution pZ|G. However, we have
pG|Z(−1|z1)
pG(−1) =
1
pG(−1)+d(1−2pG(−1)) → 0 as d → ∞, which
invalidates (1) for any  ∈ [0,∞). This shows that a large
Bayesian error probability does not guarantee information
privacy of G.
TABLE I
JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF Z AND G
PG,Z(g, z)
Z
z1 z2
G
−1 pG(−1)/d (1− 1/d)pG(−1)
1 pG(1)− pG(−1) pG(−1)
III. PRIVACY MAPPING DESIGN
In this section, we formulate a nonparametric privacy-aware
optimization framework to find privacy mappings or local
decision rules for the sensors in order to achieve information
privacy for the private hypothesis G. We show that our
approach achieves a weak form of information privacy, and we
propose iterative algorithms to solve the optimization problem.
A. Nonparametric Privacy-aware Optimization
From Proposition 1(ii), we can solve the following opti-
mization problem to obtain sensor privacy mappings {γt : t =
1, . . . , s} in order to achieve a desired level of information
privacy for G:
min
γ1,...,γs,γH
P (γH(Z) 6= H)
s.t. min
γG
R(γG) ≥ θ,
(4)
where θ is a privacy threshold that determines the information
privacy budget for G. However, since (4) requires knowledge
of the joint distribution of sensor observations and the hypothe-
ses H and G, such an approach may not be practical in IoT
applications. Instead, we propose a nonparametric approach in
which we use empirical regularized risks to approximate the
Bayesian error probability for H and the risk R(γG) for G.
LetH be a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) asso-
ciated with a kernel κ(·, ·). Let 〈·, ·〉 be the kernel inner product
associated with κ(·, ·), and ‖·‖ denote the norm induced by
the kernel inner product. Following [33], we restrict γH and
γG to be from H , i.e., γH and γG are of the form
γH(z) = 〈wH(·),Φ(z)(·)〉,
γG(z) = 〈wG(·),Φ(z)(·)〉,
where wH(·), wG(·) ∈H , and Φ(z)(·) = κ(·, z) is the feature
map, which maps a point z to a function Φ(z)(·) : Zs 7→ R.
To simplify notations, we use wH , wG, and Φ(z) respectively
in this paper.
For each t = 1, . . . , s, xt ∈ X , and zt ∈ Z , let Qt(zt |
xt) = P (Zt = zt |Xt = xt ) represent the privacy mapping
5γt. Let Q(z | x) = P (Z = z | X = x) denote the overall
sensor mapping, and Q be the set of Q(· | ·) such that
Q(z | x) =
s∏
t=1
Qt(zt | xt), (5)∑
zt∈Z
Qt(zt | xt) = 1, (6)
Qt(zt | xt) ≥ 0. (7)
Let φ be a loss function. We seek to minimize the regular-
ized empirical φ-risk of deciding H , while ensuring that the
empirical normalized φ-risk of deciding G, is higher than a
given threshold θ. We assume that we are given n i.i.d. training
data points (xi, hi, gi)ni=1, and we seek to
min
wH∈H ,Q∈Q
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
z∈Zs
φ(hi〈wH ,Φ(z)〉)Q(z | xi)
+
λ
2
‖wH‖2,
(8a)
s.t. min
wG∈H
1
2
∑
g∈{−1,1}
∑
i∈Sg,n
∑
z∈Zs
φ(gi〈wG,Φ(z)〉)Q(z | xi)
|Sg,n|
+
λn
2
‖wG‖2 ≥ θ.
(8b)
Here, Sg,n = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : gi = g}, for g ∈ {−1, 1}, and
λ > 0 and λn > 0 are regularization weights. The regularized
empirical risks are used, since without the regularization, it
is known that the generalization error can become large [43].
Note also that the empirical normalized risk in (8b) is different
from the traditional empirical risk used in the machine learning
literature (cf. (8a) and [43]), and serves as a surrogate for R(·)
in Proposition 1.
The optimization problem (8) is intractable to compute
because of the summation over Zs, therefore we employ
the same lower bound relaxation as in (15) of [33], and let
ΦQ(x) =
∑
z∈Zs Q(z|x)Φ(z). The corresponding kernel is
κQ(x,x
′) = 〈ΦQ(x),ΦQ(x′)〉 =
∑
z
∑
z′ Q(z | x)Q(z′ |
x′)κ(z, z′). With this relaxation, the convex surrogate of the
risk R(γG) becomes
Rφ(wG, Q) =
1
2
EX [φ(−〈wG,ΦQ(X)〉) | G = −1]
+
1
2
EX [φ(〈wG,ΦQ(X)〉) | G = 1] ,
(9)
and the surrogates for the empirical risks for H and G are
respectively,
F (wH , Q) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ (hi〈wH ,ΦQ(xi)〉) + λ
2
‖wH‖2, (10)
Rˆn(wG, Q) =
1
2
∑
g∈{−1,1}
∑
i∈Sg,n
φ(gi〈wG,ΦQ(xi)〉)
|Sg,n|
+
λn
2
‖wG‖2.
(11)
Our optimization problem (8) is then relaxed to
min
wH∈H ,Q∈Q
F (wH , Q) (12a)
s.t. min
wG∈H
Rˆn(wG, Q) ≥ θ. (12b)
For convenience, we call (12) the nonparametric privacy-aware
optimization (NPO) framework. We note that (8b) holds if the
constraint (12b) holds, since (12b) is a lower bound relaxation.
In general, (12b) cannot guarantee information privacy with
probability one since (12) is solved using a finite number of
training data points (xi, hi, gi)ni=1. Therefore, we introduce the
notion of weak information privacy below.
Definition 2 ((, δ)-Information privacy). Let G and Z be
random variables. For  > 0, δ ∈ [0, 1], G given Z or pG|Z
has (, δ)-information privacy, if
P
(
e− ≤ pG|Z(G | Z)
pG(G)
≤ e
)
≥ 1− δ.
Our goal is to provide a theoretical guarantee for weak in-
formation privacy with some δ ∈ (0, 1) using (12b). However,
since we are using a loss function φ as a surrogate for the 0-1
loss implied in R(·), we require the following assumptions,
which have been used to bound generalization errors in [44].
Assumption 2 (Convex loss function). The loss function φ is
a convex function and φ(0) <∞.
Assumption 3. For any η ∈ [0, 1], let R∗φ(η) =
infγ∈R (ηφ(γ) + (1− η)φ(−γ)). There exist a > 0 and r ≥ 1,
such that for all η ∈ [0, 1],
ar(φ(0)−R∗φ(η)) ≥
∣∣∣∣12 − η
∣∣∣∣r . (13)
Examples of loss functions, with their corresponding a and
r values in Assumption 3, are shown in Table II. These include
commonly used loss functions like the logistic loss function
[45], exponential loss function [46], hinge loss function [47],
and quadratic loss function, which have been shown to be
computationally efficient and have bounded approximation
and estimation errors [44], [48]. In Table II we also list the
conjugate dual φ∗ of these loss functions, which will be useful
in the sequel.
For z ∈ Zs, let η(z) = P
(
G˜ = 1
∣∣∣Z = z), where G˜
induces the same conditional distribution for Z as G but has
uniform prior. It can be shown that minγ R(γ) = 1/2 −
E [|1/2− η(Z)|] (cf. (37)). Therefore, Assumption 3 gives a
lower bound for minγ R(γ) in terms of E
[
R∗φ(η(Z))
]
. To
relate this to the left hand side of (12b), we need the following
assumption.
Assumption 4.
(i) λn → 0, as n→∞.
(ii) The kernel κ(·, ·) is a strictly positive kernel.
Examples of strictly positive kernels include the Gaussian
kernel, and kernels defined by inverse multiquadrics [49]. With
the above assumptions, the following result gives a theoretical
guarantee of weak information privacy using the constraint
(12b).
6TABLE II
LOSS FUNCTIONS, THEIR CONJUGATE DUALS, AND PARAMETERS FOR ASSUMPTION 3
Loss function φ Conjugate dual φ∗(−x∗) Assumption 3
φ(u) = e−u
{
x∗ lnx∗ − x∗, x∗ ∈ (0,∞)
0, x∗ = 0 a =
1√
2
, r = 2
φ(u) = log(1 + e−u)
{
x∗ log x∗ + (1− x∗) log(1− x∗), x∗ ∈ (0, 1)
0, x∗ = 0, 1 a =
1√
2
, r = 2
φ(u) = max{1− u, 0} −x∗, x∗ ∈ [0, 1] a = 1/2, r = 1
φ(u) = (1− u)2 (x∗)2/4− x∗, x∗ ∈ R a = 1/2, r = 2
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 hold. Then for
any δ ∈ (0, 1], there exists n0, such that for all n ≥ n0, G
achieves (, δ)-information privacy for any Q ∈ Q, if
min
wG∈H
Rˆn(wˆG, Q) ≥ θ,
where  = log c
(c−2a(φ(0)−θ+δ)1/r)
+
, with c as defined in (2).
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Theorem 1, we see that our NPO (12) can achieve
arbitrarily strong information privacy with  → 0 and δ → 0
by taking the sample size n → ∞ and θ → φ(0). The latter
condition will however result in a poor detection rate for H ,
since it leads to the case where all sensor observations are
mapped to the same output. Therefore, in the following, we
propose an iterative procedure to find a suitable threshold θ
with appropriate constraints on the privacy mappings.
B. Iterative Optimization
Let β = [β1, β2, . . . , βn]T ∈ Rn, and
Rˆ∗(β, Q) =−
∑
g∈{−1,1}
∑
i∈Sg,n
φ∗(−2|Sg,n|βi)
2|Sg,n|
− 1
2λn
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
βiβjgigjκQ(xi,xj),
(14)
where φ∗ is the conjugate dual of φ (see Table II for some
examples) [50]. From Proposition 2 in [33], for any Q, we
have
min
wG∈H
Rˆn(wG, Q) = max
β∈Rn
Rˆ∗(β, Q). (15)
The optimal primal variable wG and the optimal dual variable
β in (15) are related by wG =
∑n
i=1 βigiΦQ(xi). The con-
straint (12b) can now be rewritten as maxβ∈Rn Rˆ∗(β, Q) ≥ θ.
By using the interior-point method with log barrier [51], we
transform the optimization problem (12) into the following:
min
wH∈H ,β∈Rn,Q∈Q
F0(wH ,β, Q), (16)
where F0(wH ,β, Q) = F (wH , Q)− 1µ log(Rˆ∗(β, Q)−θ) and
µ > 0 is the barrier parameter.
We propose a two-step algorithm to solve (16). Since its
unclear how to choose the threshold θ a priori, in the first step,
we use an iterative algorithm to find θ∗, which is the maximal
possible θ, subject to some constraints on Q. The first step
also provides the initial point for the iterative algorithm in the
second step. In the second step, we set the threshold θ to be
a fixed fraction p of θ∗, and iteratively solve (16). We call
p the privacy threshold ratio. In both steps, we apply a block
Gauss-Seidel method [52]. We describe our algorithm in detail
as follows.
1) Finding the privacy threshold: In Algorithm 1, we apply
the block Gauss-Seidel method to solve
max
β∈Rn,Q∈Q′
Rˆ∗(β, Q), (17)
where Q′ is the set of Q ∈ Q, such that for all t = 1, . . . , s,∑
x∈X
Qt(z | x) ≥ ∆1, for all z ∈ Z, (18)∣∣∣∣Qt(z | x)− 1|Z|
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∆2, for all z ∈ Z and x ∈ X , (19)
with ∆1 and ∆2 being small positive constants. The constraint
(18) ensures that no z ∈ Z has small probability (otherwise
we could have reduced the size of Z), and (19) prevents
equal probabilities from being assigned to all possible z. Since
the optimization problem in (17) is non-convex, there is no
guarantee that the block Gauss-Seidel method converges to
the global optimum [52]–[54]. However, we can show the
following convergence result.
Proposition 2. Algorithm 1 converges a critical point.
Proof: See Appendix C
The objective value output from Algorithm 1 is denoted as
θ∗, and we use its solution (β˜, Q˜) as the initialization point
in the second step.
Algorithm 1 Finding θ∗
1: input: {gi, x1i , . . . , xsi}ni=1
2: initialization: β[0] ∈ Rn, Q[0] ∈ Q′, k = 0,
3: repeat
4: • k = k + 1,
• fix Q[k−1], solve the following convex optimization
problem,
β[k] = arg max
β∈Rn
Rˆ∗(β, Q[k − 1]),
• fix β[k], Qj [k], for j < t, and Qj [k − 1], for j > t,
t = 1, 2, . . . , s update
Qt[k] = arg max
Qt∈Q′
Rˆ∗(β[k], Q1[k], . . . Qt−1[k],
Qt, Qt+1[k − 1], . . . , Qs[k − 1]),
5: until Rˆ
∗(β[k],Q[k])−Rˆ∗(β[k−1],Q[k−1])
Rˆ∗(β[k−1],Q[k−1]) ≤ ,
6: return β˜ = β[k], Q˜ = Q[k], θ∗ = Rˆ∗(β[k], Q[k]).
72) Finding sensor privacy mappings: With θ∗ from Algo-
rithm 1, we set θ = pθ∗, where p ∈ (0, 1) is a constant
typically chosen to be close to 1 (see Section IV-A). We
minimize F0 over (wH ,β, Q) using a block Gauss-Seidel
method, as shown in Algorithm 2.
Let α = [α1, α2, . . . , αn]T ∈ Rn, and
F ∗(α, Q) =− 1
n
n∑
i=1
φ∗(−nαi)
− 1
2λ
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αiαjhihjκQ(xi,xj).
We have
min
wH∈H
F (wH , Q) = max
α∈Rn
F ∗(α, Q), (20)
where the optimal primal variable wH and the optimal dual
variable α in (20) are related by
wH =
n∑
i=1
αihiΦQ(xi). (21)
Instead of recording the optimal wH , which is associated
with the feature map, we record the value of α, which is
a vector of length n. Note that if we substitute the updated
wH with α according to (21), we turn the feature maps into
the kernel in the primal space. Therefore, when it comes to
updating β and Qt, we do the minimization in the primal
space.
Proposition 3. Algorithm 2 converges to a critical point.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Algorithm 2 Optimizing sensor decision rules and fusion
center rules
1: input: {hi, gi, x1i , . . . , xsi}ni=1
2: initialization: w[0] ∈ Rn,β[0]← β˜, Q[0]← Q˜, k = 0,
3: repeat
4: • k = k + 1,
• Fix β[k − 1] and Q[k − 1], and solve the following
convex optimization problem,
α[k] = arg max
α∈Rn
{F ∗(α, Q[k − 1])} ,
and we obtain wH [k] =
∑n
i=1 αi[k]hiΦQ(x),
• Fix wH [k] and Q[k − 1], update
β[k] = arg max
β∈Rn
1
µ
log
(
Rˆ∗(β, Q[k − 1])− θ
)
,
• Fix wH [k], β[k], and Q1[k], . . . , Qt−1[k], Qt+1[k −
1], Qs[k − 1], update
Qt[k] = arg min
Qt∈Q
F0(wH [k], Q
1[k], . . . , Qt−1[k],
Qt, Qt+1[k − 1], Qs[k − 1],β[k]),
5: until F0(wH [k−1],Q[k−1],β[k−1])−F0(wH [k],Q[k],β[k])F0(wH [k−1],Q[k−1],β[k−1]) ≤ ,
6: output: α[k],β[k], Q[k].
C. Extension to m-ary Private Hypothesis
In this section, we extend our NPO framework to the case
where G is an m-ary hypothesis, with m > 2. For simplicity,
the public hypothesis H remains as a binary hypothesis since
in many IoT applications like intrusion detection, detection of
whether an event has occurred is the main phenomenon of in-
terest. By using standard multi-class classification techniques,
our framework can be generalized to the case where H is a
multi hypothesis. We refer the reader to [55] for details.
Suppose that G ∈ G = {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, where m > 2.
For a detector γg that distinguishes between the hypothesis
pair (0, g), where 1 ≤ g < m, let
Rg(γg) =
1
2
(P (γg(Z) = g | G = 0) + P (γg(Z) = 0 | G = g)) ,
and
`g(z) =
pZ|G(z|g)
pZ|G(z|0) , (22)
for z ∈ Zs. The following result follows from Proposi-
tion 1(ii).
Theorem 2. Suppose that ming∈G pG(g) > 0 and
the support D of the conditional distributions of Z
given G = g for all g ∈ G are the same. If
min1≤g<m,γg Rg(γg) ≥ θ, with θ ∈ [0, 1/2], then G given
Z achieves -information privacy where  = 2 log c
′
(c′+2θ−1)+ ,
with c′ = min1≤g<m{P (`g(z) = minz∈D `g(z) | G = 0) ,
P (`g(z) = maxz∈D `g(z) | G = g)} > 0.
Proof: See Appendix E.
To achieve (, δ)-information privacy for G for δ ∈ (0, 1],
we impose the following m − 1 empirical normalized risk
constraints:
min
wg∈H
Rˆg,n(wg, Q) ≥ θ, for g = 1, . . . ,m− 1, (23)
where
Rˆg,n(w,Q) =
1
2
∑
g′∈{0,g}
∑
i∈Sg′,n
φ(g′i〈w,ΦQ(xi)〉)
|Sg′,n| +
λn
2
‖w‖2,
(24)
with g′i = −1 if gi = 0 and g′i = 1 otherwise. Note that
here, we only need to consider the empirical normalized risk
of confusing G = g ≥ 1 with G = 0, instead of every pair
of hypothesis values. The intuition is the same as in m-ary
hypothesis testing, where (22) are sufficient statistics. Indeed,
it can be shown, using the same arguments as in Theorem 1
that the following holds (we omit the proof here):
Theorem 3. Suppose the corresponding assumptions as in
Theorem 1 for m-ary hypothesis G hold. Then for any
δ ∈ (0, 1], there exists n0, such that for all n ≥ n0, G
achieves (, δ)-information privacy for any Q ∈ Q satisfying
(23), where  = 12 log
c′
(c′−2a(φ(0)−θ+δ)1/r)
+
, with c′ as defined
in Theorem 2.
We apply Algorithm 1 to each of the m− 1 constraints in
(23) to obtain a threshold θ∗g for each g = 1, . . . ,m−1. Then,
8we set θ = p ·min1≤g<m θ∗g , for some p ∈ (0, 1). Finally, in
Algorithm 2, the objective function is replaced by
min
wH∈H ,βg,Q∈Q
F (wH , Q)− 1
µ
m−1∑
g=1
log(Rˆ∗g(βg, Q)− θ),
where Rˆ∗g(βg, Q) is the dual form of Rˆg,n(wg, Q) (see (14)).
It can be shown that Proposition 3 still holds.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first perform simulations to provide
insights into how different parameters impact the performance
of our NPO approach. We then test our algorithm on real
datasets from the UCI Repository [56], and compare its
performance with RUCA [32] and MDR [31].
For simplicity, we use the count kernel in our simulations,
which is defined as κ(z, z˜) =
∑s
t=1 1{zt=z˜t}. Then, for any
Q ∈ Q, we have
κQ(x, x˜) =
s∑
t=1
∑
z∈Z
Qt(z | xt)Qt(z | x˜t),
which can be computed with a time complexity of O(s|Z|).
On the other hand, for some kernels like the Gaussian
kernel, the same computation incurs a time complexity of
O(|Z|2s). Note however that the count kernel does not satisfy
Assumption 4(ii). Nevertheless, our simulations suggest that
using the count kernel does not prevent our NPO approach
from protecting the information privacy of G. Since many
IoT devices and gateways that serve as fusion centers are
embedded platforms with limited computation power [57], the
count kernel allows practical implementation. Therefore, in our
simulations, we evaluate the performance of our algorithms
using the count kernel.
We choose the logistic loss function as φ in our simulations,
and employ gradient descent in the optimization steps in
Algorithms 1 and 2. The complexity of both Algorithms 1
and 2 using gradient descent in each optimization step and
the count kernel is O(n2s|Z|). We use ∆1 = ∆2 = 0.005 in
Algorithm 1 throughout.
A. Synthetic Data Set
In this section, we generate a synthetic data set to verify
the performance of our proposed method. We first consider
the case where G has uniform prior probability and then give
an example where G has a skewed prior. Finally, we present
simulation results for the case where G is a m-ary hypothesis,
with m > 2. To evaluate the performance of our algorithm, we
compute the Bayes errors for detecting H and G since these
are the minimum detection errors any detector can achieve so
that our results are oblivious to the choice of learning method
adopted by the fusion center. We also show the Bayes errors
of detecting H and G when Z = X (i.e., the raw sensor
observations are available at the fusion center) as a baseline
for comparison.
1) Performance of NPO framework: Consider a network
of 4 sensors and a fusion center. Each sensor observation
xti ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , 8} is generated according to Table III,
where nti is distributed uniformly over {−1, 0,+1}. In this set
of simulations, G has uniform prior. Conditioned on (H,G),
sensor observations are independent of each other. We generate
80 i.i.d. training samples and 1000 i.i.d. testing samples.
TABLE III
SENSOR OBSERVATIONS X FOR DIFFERENT REALIZATIONS OF (H,G)
(hi, gi) x
t
i
(−1,−1) 2 + nti
(−1, 1) 4 + nti
(1,−1) 6 + nti
(1, 1) 8 + nti
In Fig. 2, we show how the correlation coefficient between
H and G affects the detection error rates. Recall that the
privacy threshold is chosen to be θ = pθ∗, where θ∗ is found
using Algorithm 1. We use a privacy threshold ratio p = 0.999.
We generated both H and G with zero mean, but varying cor-
relation coefficient between them. As the correlation between
H and G becomes larger, the Bayes error for both hypotheses
converge to each other. As expected, to achieve a reasonable
Bayes error for H requires that H is not too correlated with
G.
We compare the performance of our approach with the
optimal detectors found using (4), which assumes knowledge
of the underlying joint distribution. We use the same θ as that
in our NPO to achieve the same error rate for G. We see that
our NPO achieves an error rate for H that is not too different
from the optimal detectors, even though no prior knowledge
of the underlying distribution is assumed in NPO.
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Fig. 2. Error rate of detecting H and G with different correlation coefficient
between H and G.
In Fig. 3, we show the effect of the threshold ratio p on
the error rates of detecting H and G, when their correlation
coefficients are 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. The testing error
is the empirical detection rate of the classifier found using
Algorithm 2 applied to the testing samples we generated. We
9see that when the correlation between H and G is small,
p has no significant effect on their error rates over a large
range. This is because the privacy mapping Q that minimizes
the error rate of H does not contain much information about
G. We also observe that with the NPO framework, the error
rate for H is not significantly higher than using the raw
sensor observations, whereas the error rate for G is increased
significantly. However when the correlation between H and
G is large, p has significant impact on the error rates. In this
case, as expected, we cannot find a p that induces a low error
rate for H and a high error rate for G.
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Fig. 3. Error rate of detecting H and G with varying privacy threshold ratio
p.
2) Comparison with the empirical Bayes error privacy
metric: Example 1 shows that even if the Bayes error is large,
information privacy cannot be guaranteed. In this simulation,
we demonstrate that using the empirical risk corresponding to
the Bayes error [35] as a privacy metric can lead to privacy
mappings that result in a pG|Z(g | z) that is significantly
different from pG(g), i.e., some realization Z = z can leak
significant information about the true state of G. With the em-
pirical risk corresponding to the Bayes error, our optimization
problem becomes:
min
wH∈H ,Q∈Q
F (wH , Q)
s.t. min
wG∈H
1
n
n∑
i=1
φ (gi〈wG,ΦQ(xi)〉) + λ
2
‖wG‖2 ≥ θ.
(25)
We let P (G = 1) = 0.95 and the correlation coefficient
between H and G to be 0.23. We use a similar procedure
as Algorithms 1 and 2 to find a privacy threshold and the
sensor privacy mappings for (25). The results are shown in
Table IV. We see that the Bayes errors of detecting H and G
respectively are similar for both the NPO approach and (25).
However, NPO achieves a much smaller privacy budget  (i.e.,
stronger information privacy) than (25).
3) NPO with m-ary private hypothesis: We next show the
performance of NPO when G is a m-ary hypothesis with m >
2. We let (H,G) ∈ {−1, 1} × {0, . . . ,m − 1}, H and G be
uncorrelated, with both having uniform priors. We let Xt =
m(H + 1) + 2(G + 1) + N t, where t = 1, 2, 3, 4, and for
sensors t = 5, . . . , 4 +m, we let
Xt =
{
H +N t, if G−H/2− 0.5 (mod m) ≡ t− 5
0, otherwise.
The noise N t is chosen uniformly at random from
{−1, 0,+1}. We perform training using 80 training samples,
with Z = {1, 2}.
We compare NPO with two other methods: (i) detecting
H and G when Z = X; and (ii) finding the sensor local
decision rules by minimizing F (wH , Q) without any privacy
constraints. We call this the nonparametric decentralized de-
tection (NDD) method [33].
We see from Table V that with NPO, the Bayes error of
detecting H is small, while the Bayes error of detecting G is
large, and increasing with m. Note that the maximum possible
Bayes error for G (achieved by random guessing, i.e., Z is
independent of G) is 1 − 1/m. We see that our comparison
methods fail to protect the privacy of G.
B. UCI Repository Data Sets
We test our algorithm on the OPPORTUNITY Activity
Recognition Data Set [58] and Census (Adult) Data Set
(both available at UCI Repository [56]), and compare its
performance with RUCA [32] and MDR [31]. In our NPO, we
set the local decision space of each sensor to be Z = {1, 2}.
1) Data and implementation: The OPPORTUNITY Activ-
ity Recognition Data Set consists of recorded readings of
on-body, object and ambient sensors installed in a living
space, while a person executes typical daily activities. We let
the public hypothesis be locomotion detection (standing or
walking), and the private hypothesis be the object the person
is touching (a drawer or a dish washer). We used the data
from ‘S2-Drill’, and Weka [59] to select s = 15 sensors that
are most correlated with our chosen labels. Since the sensor
reading is continuous, unsupervised discretization was applied
to quantize each continuous sensor reading to 10 levels. We
randomly sampled n = 40 instances of training data, and 3427
instances of testing data.
The Census (Adult) Data Set contains information about
a population, such as income, marital status, gender, and na-
tionality. We let the public hypothesis be whether a person has
high income (> 50K) or low income (≤ 50K), and the private
hypothesis be the marital status of the person. Following [32],
we group ‘Married-civ-spouse’, ‘Married-spouse-absent’ and
‘Married-AFspouse’ into a single category called ‘Married’,
while ‘Divorced’, ‘Separated’ and ‘Widowed’ are grouped into
a single category called ‘Used to be Married’. The ‘Never Mar-
ried’ category was left as it is. Thus the private hypothesis is a
3-ary hypothesis. We used data from ‘adult.data’, and selected
s = 5 attributes (age, education, occupation, relationship, sex)
that are most correlated with our chosen labels. Unsupervised
discretization is applied to quantize each numerical attributes
to 15 levels. We then randomly sampled n = 180 instances of
training data, and 2100 instances of testing data.
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF NPO WITH (25)
Bayes Error H Bayes Error G R(γG) Information privacy budget, 
NPO 0.03 0.05 0.38 1.08
(25) 0.02 0.05 0.24 3.91
TABLE V
BAYES ERROR WITH m-ARY PRIVATE HYPOTHESIS
m
Detect H
with NPO
Detect G
with NPO
Detect H
with Z = X
Detect G
with Z = X
Detect H
with NDD
Detect G
with NDD
3 3.62× 10−2 0.65 3.77× 10−3 1.21× 10−2 2.41× 10−2 0.13
4 2.72× 10−2 0.73 1.10× 10−3 3.92× 10−3 1.85× 10−2 0.19
5 2.13× 10−2 0.79 3.02× 10−3 4.22× 10−3 1.78× 10−2 0.23
2) Results and discussion: To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to provide a nonparametric approach to
design decentralized sensor privacy mappings. Therefore, we
compare our method to RUCA [32] and MDR [31], which are
nonparametric approaches that require a trusted data curator to
first aggregate data from all sensors before applying an overall
privacy mapping. Parameter settings for RUCA and MDR are
as proposed in [32] and [31], respectively. We also compare
with the case where sensors send their observations directly
to the fusion center, namely Z = X .
To estimate the information privacy budget achieved by each
method, we compute
ˆ = max
g∈G,z∈Zs
∣∣∣∣log pˆG,Z(g, z)pˆG(g)pˆZ(z)
∣∣∣∣ ,
where pˆA(a) is the empirical probability of the event {A = a}.
Note that a smaller ˆ implies stronger information privacy.
From Table VI and Table VII, we observe that our proposed
NPO is comparable to the other nonparametric methods that
need a trusted data curator. We also observe that NPO achieves
stronger information privacy than the other methods, since it
explicitly optimizes for this criterion.
TABLE VI
DETECTION ERRORS USING THE OPPORTUNITY ACTIVITY
RECOGNITION DATA SET.
Detection Method HLocomotion
G
Object ˆ
NPO 10.53% 43.17% 0.47
MDR 12.56% 40.16%
0.69
DCA 10.88% 42.62%
RUCA (ρp = 1) 10.23% 45.73%
RUCA (ρp = 100) 10.10% 43.01%
RUCA (ρp = 1000) 10.10% 43.78%
Z = X 10.05% 5.57%
V. CONCLUSIONS
Information privacy is the protection against statistical in-
ference of a private phenomenon. In this paper, we proved
that for a binary hypothesis, ensuring that the average of
its Type I and II errors is large, is sufficient to guarantee
information privacy. We proposed a nonparametric privacy-
aware optimization framework to find sensor privacy mappings
that can limit the fusion center’s detection rate of a private
TABLE VII
DETECTION ERRORS USING THE CENSUS (ADULT) DATA SET.
Detection Method HIncome
G
Marital-status ˆ
NPO 37.67% 62.14% 0.82
MDR 37.57% 64.02%
1.61
DCA 38.38% 56.33%
RUCA (ρp = 1) 41.24% 65.25%
RUCA (ρp = 100) 41.10% 64.14%
RUCA (ρp = 1000) 40.67% 65.86%
Z = X 34.05% 30.48%
hypothesis, without significantly compromising the detecting
ability of the public hypothesis. We proved a theoretical
guarantee of weak information privacy for our proposed
framework, and proposed iterative algorithms to solve the
proposed optimization problem. Our approach is suitable for
IoT networks in which every sensor operates independently of
the others.
Future research directions include generalizing our privacy-
aware optimization framework to networks with multiple lay-
ers so that nodes of different sensing or computation ability
can apply local decision rules of different complexities to
achieve a better overall utility-privacy tradeoff. It would also
be of interest to design sensor privacy mappings that achieve
both information and data privacy simultaneously.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We first show (i). Let Pe = P (γG(Z) 6= G) and I(·; ·) de-
note the mutual information operator. From Fano’s inequality
[42], we have
H(Pe) ≥ H(G | Z)
= H(G)− I(G;Z)
= H(G)− E
[
log
pG|Z(G|Z)
pG(G)
]
≥ H(G)− ,
where the last inequality follows from Definition 1. Since
H(Pe) is a non-decreasing function of Pe for 0 ≤ Pe ≤ 1/2,
we obtain Pe ≥ θ, where θ satisfies (3). Part (i) now follows
from R(γG) ≥ Pe/(2 maxg pG(g)).
We next show (ii). Let γG(Z) = arg minγ R(γ). It can
be shown that γG(Z) = 1 if `(Z) ≥ 1 and γG(Z) = −1
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otherwise. Let Γ = {z ∈ D : `(z) ≥ 1} and Γc = D\Γ. We
have
R(γG) =
1
2
− 1
2
∑
z∈Γ
(
pZ|G(z | 1)− pZ|G(z | −1)
)
(26)
=
1
2
+
1
2
∑
z∈Γc
(
pZ|G(z | 1)− pZ|G(z | −1)
)
. (27)
For any z′ ∈ Γ, if R(γG) ≥ θ, we have from (26),
1− 2θ ≥
∑
z∈Γ
(
pZ|G(z | 1)− pZ|G(z | −1)
)
=
∑
z∈Γ
pZ|G(z | 1)
(
1− 1
`(z)
)
≥
(
1− 1
`(z′)
) ∑
{z:`(z)≥`(z′)}
pZ|G(z | 1)
≥
(
1− 1
`(z′)
)
P
(
`(z) = max
z∈D
`(z)
∣∣∣∣G = 1)
≥ c
(
1− 1
`(z′)
)
. (28)
From (28), we obtain
1
`(z′)
≥ 1− 1− 2θ
c
,
and
1 ≤ `(z′) ≤ 1
(1− (1− 2θ)/c)+ = e
. (29)
Similarly, for any z′ ∈ Γc, a similar argument using (27) yields
e− ≤ `(z′) ≤ 1. (30)
Combining (29) and (30), we have for any z ∈ D,
e− ≤ `(z) ≤ e, (31)
and for any g ∈ {−1, 1},
e−pZ|G(z | g) ≤ pZ(z)
= EG
[
pZ|G(z | G)
] ≤ epZ|G(z | g). (32)
We then obtain (1) by noting that
pG|Z(g | z)
pG(g)
=
pZ|G(z | g)
pZ(z)
,
and the proof of the theorem is complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We start with the following elementary lemma.
Lemma B.1. For any w ∈H ,
E
[
Rˆn(w,Q)
]
= Rφ(w,Q) +
λn
2
‖w‖2,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the training
samples (Xi, Gi)ni=1.
Proof: For each g ∈ {−1, 1}, we have
E
 ∑
i∈Sg,n
φ (Gi〈w,ΦQ(Xi)〉)
|Sg,n|

=E
EX
 ∑
i∈Sg,n
φ (Gi〈w,ΦQ(Xi)〉)
|Sg,n|
∣∣∣∣∣∣G1, . . . , Gn

=E
 1
|Sg,n|
∑
i∈Sg,n
EX [φ (Gi〈w,ΦQ(Xi)〉) |Gi = g ]

=EX [φ (g〈w,ΦQ(X)〉) | G = g] .
The lemma now follows from (11) and (9).
We now prove Theorem 1. Let wˆG,n = arg min
w∈H
Rˆn(w,Q).
From Markov’s inequality, we have
P
(
Rˆn(wˆG,n, Q) ≥ inf
w∈H
Rφ(w,Q) + δ
)
≤ 1
δ
(
E
[
Rˆn(wˆG,n, Q)
]
− inf
w∈H
Rφ(w,Q)
)
=
1
δ
(
E
[
min
w∈H
Rˆn(w,Q)
]
− inf
w∈H
Rφ(w,Q)
)
≤ 1
δ
(
inf
w∈H
E
[
Rˆn(w,Q)
]
− inf
w∈H
Rφ(w,Q)
)
=
1
δ
(
inf
w∈H
{Rφ(w,Q) + λn
2
‖w‖2} − inf
w∈H
Rφ(w,Q)
)
,
(33)
where the last equality follows from Lemma B.1. If n → 0
in (33), its right hand side approaches to 0 uniformly in Q
because of Assumption 4(i) and Q is a finite set. Therefore,
there exists n0, such that for all n ≥ n0, we have with
probability 1− δ,
Rˆn(wˆG,n, Q) ≤ inf
w∈H
Rφ(w,Q) + δ. (34)
Let G˜ be a binary hypothesis with uniform prior, and satis-
fies pZ|G˜(z|g) = pZ|G(z|g) for all z ∈ Zs and g ∈ {−1, 1}.
We then have
Rφ(w,Q) =E
[
φ
(
G˜〈w,ΦQ(X)〉
)]
=E
[
φ
(
G˜〈w,EZ [Φ(Z) |X ]〉
)]
≤E
[
EZ
[
φ
(
G˜〈w,Φ(Z)〉
) ∣∣∣X ]]
=E
[
φ
(
G˜ · γ(Z)
)]
=E [(η(Z)φ(γ(Z)) + (1− η(Z))φ(−γ(Z)))] ,
(35)
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality, and we
let γ(z) = 〈w,Φ(z)〉 in the penultimate equality. Recall that
η(z) = P
(
G˜ = 1
∣∣∣Z = z). For each z ∈ Zs, let γ∗(z) =
arg infγ∈R (η(z)φ(γ) + (1− η(z))φ(−γ)), and let K be the
Gram matrix of κ(·, ·) with respect to all elements in Zs =
{z1, . . . , z|Zs|}. From Assumption 4(ii), since K is strictly
positive definite, we can define
[ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψ|Zs|] = [γ∗(z1), γ∗(z2), . . . , γ∗(z|Zs|)] ·K−1,
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and take γ(z) =
∑|Zs|
i=1 ψiκ(zi, z) = γ
∗(z) for all z ∈ Zs.
Therefore, from (35), we obtain
inf
w∈H
Rφ(w,Q) ≤ EZ
[
R∗φ(η(Z))
]
. (36)
For η ∈ [0, 1], let R∗(η) = 1/2− |1/2− η|. We then have
min
γ
R(γ)
= min
γ
E
[
(1− η(Z))1{γ(Z)≥0} + η(Z)1{γ(Z)<0}
]
=
1
2
− E
[∣∣∣∣12 − η(Z)
∣∣∣∣]
= E [R∗(η(Z))] . (37)
From Assumption 3, we obtain
E
[
R∗φ(η(Z))
] ≤φ(0)− 1
ar
E
[(
1
2
−R∗ (η(Z))
)r]
≤φ(0)− 1
ar
(
1
2
− E [R∗ (η(Z))]
)r
, (38)
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality.
Substituting (37) into (38), we have
min
γ
R(γ) ≥1
2
− a (φ(0)− E [R∗φ (η(Z))]) 1r
≥1
2
− a (φ(0)− θ + δ) 1r ,
where the last inequality follows from (34) and (36), and
holds with probability 1− δ. The theorem then follows from
Proposition 1, and the proof is complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We first show that −Rˆ∗(β, Q) is a strictly quasi-convex
function of Q if β 6= 0. The definition of strictly quasi-
convexity is borrowed from [52] as follows.
Definition C.1. A function f(x1, x2, . . . , xs) is called a
strictly quasi-convex function of x1, . . . , xs, if for all k ∈
(1, . . . , s),
f(x1, . . . , px
1
k + (1− p)x2k, . . . , xs)
< max(f(x1, . . . , x
1
k, . . . , xs), f(x1, . . . , x
2
k, . . . , xs)),
for any p ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma C.1. Suppose that β 6= 0. Then, −Rˆ∗(β, Q) is a
strictly quasi-convex function of Qt, t = 1, 2, . . . , s, for Q ∈
Q′.
Proof: For each Q ∈ Q′, consider
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
βiβjgigjκQ(xi,xj)
=
∑
i,k
∑
j,k′
Q(zk|xi)Q(zk′ |xj)βiβjgigjκ(zk, zk′) (39)
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i,k
βigiQ(zk|xi)Φ(zk)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
> 0,
where the last inequality holds due to Assumption 4(ii) since
β 6= 0, and Qt 6= 0 for all t = 1, . . . , s because of (18). From
(14) and (39), −Rˆ∗(β, Q) is a positive definite quadratic form
of Qt, for each t = 1, 2, . . . , s, and is thus a strictly convex
function of Qt. This implies strict quasi-convexity, and the
proof of the lemma is complete.
We now show that {β[k]} and {Q[k]} in Algorithm 1 have
limit points. Since φ∗(·) ≥ −φ(0) > −∞ , −Rˆ∗(β, Q) is
lower bounded. Therefore, the decreasing sequence F [k] =
−Rˆ∗(β[k], Q[k]) converges [60]. From Proposition 4 of [52],
convergence of {F [k]} implies convergence of {β[k]} and
{Q[k]} to limit points. By Proposition 5 of [52], this shows
that Algorithm 1 converges to a critical point. The proof of
the proposition is now complete.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
From [33], F (wH , Q) is a convex function of Qt, for each
t = 1, 2, . . . , s. Since − log(·) is a non-increasing convex
function, and Rˆ∗(β, Q) − θ is a strictly concave function of
Qt, − 1µ log(Rˆ∗(β, Q) − θ) is strictly convex with respect to
Qt [51]. Therefore, F0(wH ,β, Q) is a strictly quasi-convex
function of Qt, t = 1, . . . , s (see Definition C.1). The rest of
the proof is similar to that in Appendix C.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Following the same argument as that in the proof of
Proposition 1(ii), for any 1 ≤ g < m and z ∈ D′, we have
from (31),
e−/2 ≤ `g(z) ≤ e/2,
and for any g, g′ ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1},
e− ≤ pZ|G(z | g)
pZ|G(z | g′) ≤ e
.
The proof then proceeds similarly as that in Proposition 1(ii).
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